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1 Introduction
The current crisis is showing how business cycle fluctuations can be enlarged
by different self-reinforcing mechanisms. Riccetti et al. (2013) consider a
twofold financial accelerator, composed by the “leverage” and the “network-
based” accelerators. The former explains that a negative shock on firms’
output make banks less willing to loan funds, with a consequent credit con-
straint and an increase of the interest rate; furthermore, firms are less prone
to invest because they compare a reduced expected profit with an increased
cost of funding; therefore, the reduced investments lead again to a lower out-
put in a vicious circle. The network-based financial accelerator (Delli Gatti
et al., 2010) highlights that the presence of a credit network may produce
an avalanche of firms’ bankruptcies: the bankruptcy of a firm may bring
“bad debt” that affects the net worth of banks, which can also go bankrupt
or, if they manage to survive, they will react to the deterioration of the net
worth increasing the interest rate to all their borrowers (Stiglitz and Gre-
enwald, 2003, p.145), making them incur additional difficulties in servicing
debt and thus increasing the weakness of the whole non-financial sector, in
another vicious circle. In addition, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990, 1995)
and Bernanke et al. (1999) show the presence of another positive feedback
mechanism: a reduction of asset values held by the entrepreneurs generates
an increase of the borrowers’ leverage and, subsequently, of the risk premium
with a consequent reduction of the economic activity; in our speech, there
is a strengthening of the “leverage accelerator”. The asset we consider in
our analysis is the stock market value of firms’ equity, therefore we call this
mechanism the “stock market” financial accelerator.
Indeed, starting from Delli Gatti et al. (2010) and Riccetti et al. (2013), in
this paper we build an agent based macroeconomic model that also considers
the presence of the stock market, although it is added in a stylized way. As
in Riccetti et al. (2013), the firms’ financial structure relies upon the Dy-
namic Trade-Off theory. For a review on the Dynamic Trade-Off theory, see
for instance Flannery and Rangan (2006), Frank and Goyal (2008 and 2015)
and Riccetti et al. (2013). Following this theory we assume that firms have
a “target leverage”, implying that a growing firm decides to increase its debt
level, thus creating in good periods the basis for the subsequent crisis. In this
setting, we also consider the loss given default rate (LGDR) – see Section 4
– that is important because it is one of the components, with the probability
of default (PD) and the exposure at default (EAD), of the credit risk models.
Moreover, we set the firms’ stock market value by using the earning-per-share
(EPS) multiplier, consistent with the dividend discount model. Stock market
values influence the distance-to-default (DD), a measure of credit risk widely
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used by many banks and developed in the Moody’s KMV Portfolio Manager
model. We use a proxy of the DD, based on stock market return and re-
turn’s variance, to evaluate firms’ financial soundness and, thus, to set the
interest rates charged by banks to them. Moreover, we add a risk aversion
parameter able to modulate the impact of stock market volatility on firms’
DD evaluation. Therefore, we build a methodology in which the agent-based
approach, used for modeling the credit market, interacts with some stylized
mechanisms, used to represent some features of the stock market, based on
techniques derived from the mainstream literature. In other words, beyond
the specific conclusions of our simulations, the paper contribution to the
existing literature is twofold:
• theoretically, we describe a triple financial accelerator, adding the “stock
market accelerator”;
• methodologically, we insert in an agent-based model some simple mech-
anisms, well known in mainstream literature, able to describe some
empirical features, such as the relationship between profits and stock
market values or the relationship between stock market values and mon-
etary policy.
Instead, regarding the output of the simulations, our model allows to analyze:
• how a shock on the real side of the economy can be amplified, through
the stock market multiplier, further increasing the financial accelerator
mechanism and the overall fragility of the system. In other words, the
interplay between forward-looking evaluation of firms’ future profits
provided by the stock market and the interest rate setting due to bank
lending attitudes may lead to a boom-bust cycle;
• whether a shock on the financial market may be dangerous for the
real economy; indeed, we investigate the evolution of the economic
environment when the stock market multiplier increases - considered
as a symptom of a mounting financial market bubble - in order to
ascertain if this results in a riskier systemic configuration;
• how banks’ risk aversion can influence the economic environment;
• how the central bank can influence the economic cycle modifying the in-
terest rate; indeed, the interplay between the interest rate and the stock
market evaluation can modify the effectiveness of monetary policy, com-
pared to the case in which the stock market is absent (or non relevant).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next Section
we present the characteristics of our model. Then, firms’ behavior is ana-
lyzed in Section 3, while Section 4 considers the banking sector. Simulation
results are presented in section 5. A sensitivity analysis on two important
parameters regarding the stock market is developed in Section 6. In Sec-
tion 7 we propose an extension of the baseline model and a monetary policy
experiment. Section 8 concludes.
2 Environment
Our economy is populated by households (final consumers and labor suppli-
ers), firms and banks. Firms - indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., I - produce consumption
goods. Banks, indexed by z = 1, 2, ..., Z, extend credit to firms.
We consider three markets: consumption goods, stock and credit markets.
We will focus on the last market, making simplifying assumptions for the first
and second ones. Moreover, we do not explicitly model the labor market1.
On the market for consumption goods there are consumers and firms.
Prices are exogenously determined: following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993),
we assume that on the market for consumption goods, prices are governed by
a random process. We suppose that consumers buy all the output that firms
produce at the stochastic price. Prices on good market have the important
role of determining profits, which in turn affect the accumulation of net worth
and financial fragility.
In the stock market we take firm prices determined by using the earning-
per-share (EPS) multiplier. These values influence the evaluation of firms’
financial soundness made by banks and, thus, influence the interest rates.
The credit market is the focus of the model, where firms and banks inter-
act. The net worth of firms is the “engine” of fluctuations for the economy:
we assume that the scale of production of firms is constrained only by their
net worth, then it turns out to be the main driver of fluctuations. A shock
to a firm affects the credit relationship between the firm and the bank: if the
shock is large enough, the firm may be unable to fulfill debt commitments
and may go bankrupt. In a networked economy, the bankruptcy of a firm
may bring “bad debt” - i.e. non-performing loans - that affects the net worth
of banks, which can also go bankrupt or, if they manage to survive, will react
to the deterioration of their net worth increasing the interest rate to all their
borrowers. Hence, borrowers may incur additional difficulties in servicing
1The lack of this market does not change the theoretical framework compared to a
model where the labor market is present, workers obtain a fixed slice of aggregate income
and entrepreneurs set a mark-up on the labor cost.
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debt thus increasing the weakness of the whole non-financial sector and the
number of bankruptcies itself (network-based financial accelerator).
The endogenous evolution of credit interlinkages affects the extent of bank-
ruptcies’ diffusion: the bankruptcy of a highly connected agent increases the
probability of bankruptcy diffusion across the network. The structure of the
network of credit relationships evolves endogenously because in every period
each firm looks (myopically) for the bank with the lowest interest rate.
3 Firms
Firms operates on all the three considered markets.
3.1 Goods market
On the market for consumption goods there are consumers and firms. Prices
are determined following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993): we suppose that
consumers buy all the output that firms produce at the stochastic price. The
output produced by firm i is Yi,t and, following Delli Gatti et al. (2010), it is
an increasing concave function of its net worth Ai,t. Indeed, we assume that
the production function (called “financially constrained output function”,
because β is less than 1) is:
Yi,t = φK
β
i,t (1)
where φ > 1 and 0 < β < 1 are parameters uniform across firms and Ki,t is
the total capital of the i firm at time t, composed by the sum of net worth
and debt Bi,t. Yi,t is a function of Ai,t given that, following the Dynamic
Trade-off theory for firms’ capital structure, we assume that the amount of
debt is a function of the net worth too.
According to the Dynamic Trade-off theory, firms have long-run leverage
targets, but they do not immediately reach them, instead they adjust toward
them during some periods. The leverage level is set by firms by following an
adaptive behavioral rule according to which the current leverage level is equal
to the previous level modified by a random percentage increase (decrease)
when the expected price pei,t is larger (smaller) than the expected interest
rate on bank loans rei,t:
Leveragei,t = Leveragei,t−1(1± adj · random) (2)
where adj is a parameter that set the maximum leverage change between
the two periods and is multiplied by a random number drawn by a uniform
distribution between 0 and 1. The sign is + if pei,t > r
e
i,t and it is - otherwise.
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Here pei,t and r
e
i,t are set adaptively, that is equal to the price and to the
interest rate of the previous period. Therefore, the leverage level changes
among firms and over time given the evolution of pi,t and ri,t. Moreover, the
leverage level cannot be set below a 1% level.
A target debt B∗i,t follows:
B∗i,t = Ai,tLeveragei,t (3)
As in Riccetti et al. (2013), we assume that debt last for two periods and
every period each firm asks for an amount of debt equal to the difference
between the target debt and the residual amount of debt Bi,t−1 made in the
previous period (and that will expire in period t+ 1):
Bi,t = max(B
∗
i,t −Bi,t−1, 0) (4)
If a firm suffers high losses that, reducing the net worth, make the debt tar-
get smaller than the previous debt, then the firm does not ask for new debt.
We assume that the nominal debt requested at time t is fully reimbursed at
time t + 2, while interest on the debt is paid both at time t + 1 and t + 2.
Accordingly, if a firm asks for a new debt at time t + 1 (in order to match
the new target debt), it will fully reimburse this new debt at time t+ 3, and
so on.
With these assumptions, we address three issues: (i) firms prefer multiperi-
odal debt; (ii) firms may have two different banks to obtain credit (in practice
big firms often have syndicated loans or multiple banks) and this is another
factor able to spread the financial instability in the network; (iii) as implied
by the Dynamic Trade-off theory, firms that suffer high losses may present
a real debt higher than that implied by the current target (because now the
target is lower than the previous period debt) and this rigidity may cause
financial problems to firms.
The total capital is consequently calculated:
Ki,t = Ai,t +Bi,t +Bi,t−1 (5)
Firms’ profit is calculated at the end of each period and is given by the
following equation:
Pri,t = pi,tYi,t − ri,tBi,t − ri,t−1Bi,t−1 (6)
where Yi,t is the output, ri,t is the interest rate paid on the last loan (Bi,t),
ri,t−1 is the interest rate paid on the previous period loan (Bi,t−1), and pi,t is
the stochastic gain per unit of output, that contains the stochastic price net
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of the expenses for producing the output itself (but for financial costs). The
rationale is the same explained in Delli Gatti et al. (2010): given the prede-
termined supply, the relative price is an increasing function of the demand
disturbance. A high realization of pi,t can be thought of as a regime of high
demand which drives up the relative price of the commodity in question. On
the other hand, in a regime of low demand, the realization of pi,t turns out to
be low and may push the firm to the bankruptcy. In practice pi,t is composed
by three parts:
pi,t = α +
Divt−1 + c · Az,t−1 − Anewi,t − Anewz,t
Yt−1
+ gi,t (7)
where
• α > 0 represents an exogenous and positive component of the profit;
• (Divt−1 + c · Az,t−1 − Anewi,t − Anewz,t )/Yt−1 is an endogenous term of the
profit, that is an aggregate demand component influenced by the busi-
ness cycle. It increases the aggregate demand if the previous period
aggregate dividends Divt−1 or costs paid by banks (c · Az,t−1, see also
Section 4.2)2 increases and it decreases the demand if agents go bank-
rupt because part of the total income has to be spent to replace the
defaulted firms and banks with new firms and banks that require an
initial net worth, Anewi,t , A
new
z,t ;
• gi,t is the firm’s specific random component. We assume that the ran-
dom term is distributed as a Gaussian with zero mean and finite vari-
ance (varp).
Profits (Pri,t) are a key component of the model for two reasons. First,
they determine firms’ net worth Ai,t: Ai,t+1 = Ai,t + Pri,t − Divi,t, where
only firms with net worth larger than 1 distribute a fraction div of positive
profits as dividends Divi,t. The firm goes bankrupt if Ai,t+1 < 0, i.e. if it
incurs a loss (negative profit) and the loss is big enough to deplete net worth:
Pri,t <= −Ai,t; when a firm goes bankrupt, we assume that a new firm enters
in the market with a small random net worth. Second, profits determine the
earning-per-share (EPS) used in the evaluation of the firms’ market value in
the stock market, that we will now analyze.
2We assume that the costs paid by banks are an income for the household sector, which
spends such an income to consume final goods.
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3.2 Stock market
We set the firms’ stock market price as a long run value. Thus, we focus
on the so-called fundamentalist investors (with a long investment horizon),
avoiding chartist trader effects. Then, we use the earning-per-share (EPS)
multiplier, that is the technique most used by the fundamentalists, and the
accounting value, as proxy for all the other fundamentalist techniques. In
particular, the market value is set in the following way:
Amkti,t = 0.5 · Ai,t + 0.5 ·max(Pri,t−1 ·moltp, 0) (8)
where moltp is the EPS multiplier3.
We have adopted a basic price mechanism, without a real modeling of the
stock market for the sake of simplicity. We will relax these assumptions in
further extensions of the present model, considering the criticism made in the
field of behavioral finance and modeled by many agent based models, that
shows that deviations from the “fair price” are common and caused simply,
for instance, by the presence of chartist traders or by herding behavior (as an
example of this large literature strands, see Tedeschi et al., 2012). However,
EPS multiplier practice is also grounded on the dividend discount model:
the price of an asset is determined by the expected dividend supposed to be
generated for all the future history of the firm and discounted with the rate
representative of the firm’s cost of capital, that is composed by the risk free
rate plus a risk premium (often based on the capital asset pricing model)4. In
line with the practice in financial markets, fundamentalists use the earnings
and not the dividends, because the fraction of not distributed earnings is
retained in firms’ net worth and then reinvested in firms’ production. This
should generate an increase in the future flow of profits (and consequently
dividends) that fundamentalists incorporate in their behavioral rule based
on the EPS multiplier.
The stock market values influence the evaluation of firms’ financial sound-
ness made by banks and, thus, influence the interest rates.
We assume that the stock market is not used for the initial public offering
(IPO) or to issue/buy-back new securities, then it is just a secondary market.
Thus, firms can finance themselves only by self-financing and bank credit.
3We use the max function because the value of the profits can be negative enough
to make the overall market value negative. This is a simplifying assumption. In fact,
fundamental analysts put beside EPS multiplier other multipliers in order to prevent
negative stock price forecast driven by negative profits.
4The most famous dividend discount model is the Gordon (1959) model. The Gordon
model is based on the assumptions of a never-ending dividend, of a constant growth rate
of the dividend and a constant cost of equity capital (larger that the growth rate of the
dividend).
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3.3 Credit market
In this market firms and banks interact. In every period each firm asks for
a debt that lasts two periods as explained before. Initially, firm-bank links
are set randomly. Afterwards, in every period each borrower observes the
interest rates of a fraction χ of randomly selected banks. We assume, as done
in Delli Gatti et al. (2010), that the firm changes bank with a probability ps
of switching to the new lender that increases (in a non-linear way) when rnew
(the interest rate set by the observed potential new bank) lowers compared
to rold (the previous bank’s interest rate):
ps = 1− eλ(rnew−rold)/rnew (9)
In this way, we model the sticky connection between a borrower and its
banks, due to the (asymmetric) information on the firm owned by the banks.
An increasing parameter λ > 0 represents a growing propensity of switching
from a bank to another according to the best interest rate. In this way the
structure of the network of credit relationships evolves endogenously due to
a decentralized mechanism of interaction. Thus, prices on the credit market
(that is, interest rates) have two important roles: (i) they influence profits,
which affect both net worth accumulation and financial fragility, (ii) they
shape the evolving topology of the credit network. Indeed, financially sound
banks may charge lower prices thus attracting new partners. As a con-
sequence, their profits go up and their financial conditions improve, making
room for even lower interest rates in the future and more new partners. This
self-reinforcing mechanism gives rise to an endogenous evolution of the credit
network that will be characterized by a right-skew distribution of node de-
gree: there will be some nodes characterized by a relatively high number of
links (“hubs”) and a majority of nodes with a small number of connections.
Higher values of parameters λ and χ increase the banking sector concentra-
tion. We calibrate the value of the parameter λ in order to obtain a banks’
degree distribution similar to the real Japanese one at year 2000, thus we set
λ = 4 (for the calibration procedure, see Bargigli et al., 2014).
Moreover, we add a fixed commission equal to the 1% of the expiring debt
if the firm changes the partner bank, as a proxy for information and admin-
istrative costs. In order to complete the description of the credit market,
we need to explain how banks set the interest rate, then we now introduce
banks.
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4 Banks
4.1 Interest rate setting
As said above, we assume that the stock market works as a secondary market,
thus firms can finance production only by self-financing and bank credit.
Moreover, every bank sets a different interest rate on loans and these spreads
imply that firms sometimes change banks to obtain a lower interest rate,
following the mechanism explained in Section 3.3. We assume that bank z
adopts the following rule in setting the interest rate on loans to borrower i:
ri,t = rCBt + f1(Az,t, Dz,t) + f2(DDi,t, Ai,t) (10)
Thus the interest rate is composed of three parts:
1. the policy rate set by the central bank: rCBt;
2. a term that decreases with the financial soundness of the bank (proxied
by the inverse of bank’s leverage). Indeed, as already said, if the bank
is in good shape from the financial point of view, it will be eager to
extend credit at more favorable terms to increase its market share. We
set this term as follows:
f1(Az,t, Dz,t) =
(
Az,t +Dz,t
Az,t
)γ
− 1 (11)
where Dz,t is the amount of deposits that bank z has at time t, calcu-
lated as the difference between extended credit and net worth, while
γ > 0 is a risk premium parameter;
3. a term that incorporates a risk premium decreasing with borrower’s
Distance to Default (DDi,t), that we will analyze hereafter, and de-
creasing for larger firms. Thus, we set:
f2(DDi,t, Ai,t) = γ · (Bi,t +Bi,t−1)
[weight · Amkti,t
σ
1/ψ
i,t
+ (1− weight) · Ai,t]
· 1
(1 +
Ai,t
Amaxi,t
)
(12)
Equation 12 is a proxy of the inverse relationship between the DD
and the risk premium, because the risk premium declines as the stock
market value Amkt increases or the stock market return volatility σ
decreases (σ is equal to 1 plus the standard deviation of the firm’s as-
sets market value calculated on the last TT periods5 divided by 100).
5New firms have the standard deviation set at the highest value among the survival
firms.
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Market volatility evaluation is influenced by a risk propensity para-
meter ψ > 0: when ψ grows, banks are less risk averse, that is less
afraid of market volatility, and reduces the interest rates. The para-
meter weight determines how strong is the stock market component
in the firm evaluation ranging from 0 to 1 (and it could be seen as
a presence of a mark-to-market mechanism instead of a balance sheet
evaluation): if weight is set at its upper bound, that is 1, banks only
consider the market value, while if it is equal to its lower bound, that is
0, they only consider the accounting value. Amax is the accounting net
worth of the biggest firm, therefore (1 + Ai,t/A
max
i,t ) is a correction so
that larger firms obtain lower interest rates (all the other components
being equal)6.
As for DD, this is a widely used market-based measure of corporate de-
fault risk. It was introduced in the Portfolio Manager model developed by
the KMV society7 that was later acquired by Moody’s. Banks widely use
measures like the DD, because this is a simple way to introduce in the firm
evaluation a forward looking analysis based on the market ability to incor-
porate firm prospects in the market price. Indeed, a firm with a high stock
market capitalization should easily obtain credit from banks, given that the
firm may also issue new equities on the stock market to repay previous debts.
This is then a sort of collateral.
Many authors find that the DD is an effective method to explain differences
in credit spreads; for example Campbell and Taksler (2003) find that equity
volatility of corresponding stocks explains as much variation in corporate
credit spreads as credit ratings do or, in other words, that equity volatility
affects loan ratings.
The DD is derived from the structural evaluation model of corporate debt
introduced by Merton (1974) and it is based on the two following features:
the higher the value of the firm’s net worth or the lower the volatility of the
firm’s net worth, the further away from default the firm is. The framework is
built on an accounting identity: the value of the firm, V , (or the value of its
assets) should be equal to the sum of the values of its debt, B, and equity,
Amkt. Here we use V instead of K, because V is a market based value of
the total assets, while K is a balance sheet value:
Vi,t = Amkti,t +Bi,t +Bi,t−1; (13)
6The largest firm divides the f2 component of the interest rate by 2, while the smallest
firms divide it by a value near to 1. The resulting value is multiplied by the risk premium
parameter γ > 0.
7KMV from the names of the founders: Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek.
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Given that debt is senior to equity, equity holders are residual claimants to
the firm: firm’s assets are first used to pay debt holders, and the left part is
distributed to shareholders. Thus the value of equity is:
Ei,t = max(0, Vi,t −Bi,t −Bi,t−1) (14)
The payoff to shareholders is equivalent to a call option on the value of the
firm with a strike price equal to the face value of debt, also known as default
barrier. This formula implies that the higher the value of the firm’s assets,
Vi,t, relative to the strike price or default barrier, Bi,t + Bi,t−1, the further
away from default the firm is. In the case of the widely used Merton (1974)
model, where the asset value of the firm are assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion process, the distance-to-default T periods ahead is given
by:
DDi,t =
ln
Vi,t
Bi,t+Bi,t−1
+ T (µi,t − σ
2
i,t
2
)
σi,t
√
T
(15)
where µi,t and σi,t are respectively the mean and the volatility of the growth
rate of firm’s asset value Vi,t. As shown by equation 15, DD increases when Vi,t
grows and when the volatility of asset value reduces. Given that the DD and
the risk premium f2 are inversely related, Equation 12 shows that f2 reduces
when Amkti,t (and therefore Vi,t) increases or σi,t decreases. Moreover, as
already said, we compute the growth volatility using the value of Vi,t of the
last TT periods.
In this model we insert the stock market influence on banks only indir-
ectly, through the distance-to-default mechanism. In fact, universal banks
can suffer from stock market volatility because they directly invest part of
their capital in stocks (trading book). So our findings could be enriched by
this channel, that we will investigate in an extended version of the model.
4.2 Banks profit and net worth
Banks’ net worth Ai,t evolves in the following way:
Az,t+1 = Az,t + Prz,t (16)
where Prz,t is bank z profit at time t, given by:
Prz,t =
∑
ri,tBi,t +
∑
ri,t−1Bi,t−1 − rCBt ·Dz,t − c · Az,t − badz,t; (17)
where ri,t is the interest rate paid on the credit Bi,t (if firm i has not gone
bankrupt), rCBt is the Central Bank official interest rate, that we assume to
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be also the interest rate paid by bank z on its deposits Dz,t, c is a fixed cost
paid by every bank depending on its size (proxied by the net worth), and
badz,t is the bad debt of the bank. In particular, badz,t is computed as the
sum of all the credit provided to firms defaulted in period t, multiplied by
the loss given default rate (LGDR), that is 1 less the recovery rate (RR). RR
is computed as the ratio between the asset and the debt of the bankrupted
firm and decreased by a fixed amount for the legal expenditure LE (that, in
the baseline model, we assume equal to 10% of the debt). In this way we
insert both the two most important components of the credit risk models:
the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default rate (LGDR).
5 Simulations
We analyze our economy by means of computer simulations. We assume that
this economy is composed by 500 firms and 50 banks over a time span of 1000
periods. However, we use the first 200 periods to initialize the simulation,
therefore we present the last 800 periods only.
At the beginning of the simulation, we set the net worth of each firm and
bank to 10. We assume that when a firm or a bank goes bankrupt it is
replaced by a new one with net worth equal to a random number between 0
and 2 for firms and between 0 and 10 for banks. The parameter used are in
Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter setting.
Parameter Value Meaning
φ 2 see production function eq.1
β 0.8 see production function eq.1
α 5% expected mark-up, see eq.7
varp 0.1 profit variance, see eq.7
div 20% percentage of profits distributed as dividends
moltp 20 EPS multiplier, see eq.8
adj 20% max leverage change allowed to firms in one period, see eq.2
rCB 2% central bank monetary policy rate, see eq.10
γ 1% risk premium parameter, see eq.11 and eq.12
weight 1 % stock market influence on firm evaluation, see eq.12
ψ 5 risk propensity parameter, see eq.12
TT 5 periods to calculate st. dev. of market value of firm’s assets
c 0.2 bank operational costs, see eq.17
χ 20% percentage of bank observed by each firm in every period
λ 4 propensity of switching from a bank to another, see eq.9
LE 10% legal expenditure for firm’s bankruptcy, added to LGDR
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We do not perform a validation exercise, given that we have sketched
many characteristics of the economic system and we have neglected some
others such as the labor market, even if we calibrate parameter values to re-
produce some empirical regularities in the simulated data, as already found
in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) or Riccetti et al. (2013). For example, even
if all firms start from the same conditions, they become rapidly heterogen-
eous and a right-skewed distribution of firms’ size emerges. This feature also
emerges for banks, which concurrently present a right-skewed distribution of
the number of borrower firms (the degree distribution of the credit network).
However, in Section 6 we perform a sensitivity analysis to show some inter-
esting features related to the different values of model parameters.
As already said, our model extends the analysis of Riccetti et al. (2013) by
considering the stock market dynamics. Now, the mechanism of the Network-
based Financial Accelerator is threefold:
1. leverage accelerator. A firm that makes less (or negative) profit,
lowers its growth (or its activity), reducing both the amount of in-
ternal funds and of external finance. Here we assume that the firm
asks less credit, but this characteristic could be theoretically coupled
with the unavailability of banks to loan funds to a firm with smaller
cash flow and smaller value of firm’s collateral. Hence the firm reduces
its investment, leading to a lower output, a lower profit, and yet again
lower investment. In other words, there is a leverage cycle that en-
larges business fluctuations, as shown in the upper right plot of Fig.2:
when net worth increases, leverage increases boosting the production
(positive correlation on the left side of the cross-correlogram), but after
a while this leads to growing instability that will revert the business
cycle (negative correlation on the right side of the cross-correlogram);
2. stock market accelerator. After lower profits, the firm’s capitaliza-
tion on the stock market decreases; thus DD reduces and banks charge
a higher interest rate. This further reduces the firm’s profit, boost-
ing the previous mechanism. Hence, the presence of the stock market
amplifies the leverage financial accelerator mechanism, given that the
interest rate is set following a profit multiplier. Moreover, just a small
reduction of profits can trigger this financial accelerator8. We study
the ratio between stock market capitalization and balance sheet net
8For example, in year t a firm has a total capital of 20, composed by 10 of net worth
and 10 of debt (Ki,t = Ai,t + Bi,t), a profit of 3 and, with a multiplier of 20, a market
capitalization of 35 (0.5 · 20 · 3 + 0.5 · 10); the next year the firm makes again a positive
profit of 2 and net worth increases to 12, but the market capitalization decreases from 35
to 26, with a -26% of return that reduces the distance to default and increases the interest
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worth (we call it capitalization ratio): when it grows, overall output
level grows but after a while the output tends to decrease, because
there is an increasing probability of trigger the explained mechanism.
In this way we represent the possible creation of a bubble and the sub-
sequent crisis. Indeed, the cross-correlation between the capitalization
ratio and the number of bankruptcies shows that a bubble increases the
probability of a crisis: the growth of this ratio is related with following
firm and bank defaults rise, as shown in the bottom plots of Fig.1;
3. network-based accelerator. A firm could even not be able to pay
its debt to banks and goes bankrupt. Partner banks record a non-
performing loan that reduces their net worth. If banks are not fin-
ancially robust, they could also go bankrupt. Instead, if the loan is
relatively small compared to the banks’ net worth, they survive the
loss; however, even in this case, banks increase the interest rates to
other borrowers to cover the loss; the increased interest rates reduce
firms’ profit, enacting again the leverage financial accelerator or, if other
firms go bankrupt, enlarging the network-based mechanism. In both
cases, with or without bank defaults, the initial shock spreads across
the financial network, with the possibility to create an avalanche of
bankruptcies, which amplifies business fluctuations. In our simulations,
financial fragility creates quite strong bankruptcies avalanches with the
number of defaulted banks in the same period that is in mean equal
to the 0.45% of the overall number of banks (that is 50), but it ranges
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8% of the banks in the economy;
moreover, bankruptcies tend to cluster in subsequent periods; the dis-
tribution of bank defaults present positive skewness (2.69) and high
kurtosis (11.86). However, this propagation could be dampened (or in-
creased) considering the interbank market, that we want to introduce
in further extensions of the present model. Bank defaults are triggered
by bad debt (firm bankruptcies): correlation coefficient is statistically
significant and equal to 54.5% (Fig.2 panel bottom-right). Analyzing
the distribution of firm’s bankruptcies, we observe that they vary from
a minimum of 4 (0.8% of overall firms) to a maximum of 28 (5.6%),
with a mean of 12.78 and a positive skewness of 0.38.
The first mechanism, as already said, is the leverage financial accelerator;
the second mechanism due to the presence of the stock market, that is the in-
novation of this paper, reinforces the first; the third is the accelerator due to
rate that banks will charge on following credits: the firm becomes to be finacially weaker,
even if it is still profitable.
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Figure 1: Cross-correlations between: (i) firms’ leverage and firms’ defaults;
(ii) firms’ leverage and banks’ defaults; (iii) firms’ capitalization ratio (e.g.,
market values over balance sheet value of firms) and firms’ defaults; (iv)
firms’ capitalization ratio and banks’ defaults.
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Figure 2: Cross-correlations between: (i) firms’ leverage and bad debt ratio
(e.g., total bad debt over total credit); (ii) firms’ leverage and firms’ net
worth; (iii) firms’ capitalization ratio and firms’ leverage; (iv) firms’ leverage
and mean interest rate; (v) mean interest rate and bad debt ratio; (vi) bad
debt ratio and banks’ defaults.
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the network. The first two mechanisms are the trigger of the accelerator, the
third makes possible that an idiosyncratic shock creates an extended/global
crisis, without the need of a systemic shock. The instability due to the first
two accelerators is shown in Figure 1: an increasing firms’ leverage or an
increasing stock market bubble enlarges the number of subsequent firm and
bank’s defaults. We can divide the overall causal sequence in many parts, fol-
lowing Figure 2. The leverage accelerator is described in the two upper plots,
that show the already explained leverage cycle: when the economy is grow-
ing, that is the net worth increases and the bad debt reduces, firms increase
their leverage (because of increased expected profits); the high leverage makes
the cycle to revert, increasing bad debt and decreasing net worth. Indeed,
if leverage grows, banks require a higher interest rate (center-right panel),
that reduces firms’ gain and increases bankruptcies (bottom-left plot). Firms
bankruptcies, through consequent bad debt, increase the number of bank de-
faults (bottom-right panel). The leverage cycle can be enlarged by the stock
market (forward-looking) fluctuations: when the stock market capitalization
increases, an interest rate reduction follows causing a higher leverage (pos-
itive correlation between capitalization ratio and leverage in the center-left
plot) and thus starting or boosting the leverage accelerator mechanism. In
other words, the stock market seems to reinforce the leverage cycle.
Till now, we have presented a model with real shocks to firms, that,
reducing profits, start the first two mechanism. Now, we can study:
• how the presence of the stock market in the firms’ evaluation done by
banks affects the output (parameter weight);
• how the stock market volatility affects the real performance of the eco-
nomy (parameter moltp).
Moreover, in Section 7, we will analyze the influence of the stock market on
the monetary policy effectiveness9.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we discuss the effect of parameter changes weight and moltp
in terms of the following output variables: the mean aggregate production,
the volatility of the aggregate production’s growth rate, the average interest
rate, the mean firms’ leverage, the average aggregate firms’ net worth, the
9For the sensitivity analysis of most of the other parameters, we refer to Riccetti et al.
(2013). Indeed, even if the model is not exactly the same, the qualitative findings of that
sensitivity analysis are still valid.
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mean number of firms’ bankruptcies, the average value of bad debt ratio
(the sum of all debts of defaulted firms in the period divided by the overall
outstanding credit), the average number of bank defaults. These statistics
are calculated, for each simulation, on the time series from period 301 to
period 1000.
6.1 Parameter weight
Parameter weight determines the weight of the stock market component in
the firm evaluation done by a bank in order to set the interest rate (see
Equation 12). The same simulation is repeated for each value of weight
between 0 and 1, with step 0.05. Moreover, we study how the risk aversion
of banks modifies the output, comparing the sensitivity analyses for two dif-
ferent values of the risk propensity parameter ψ (that is ψ = 2 and ψ = 20),
keeping all the other parameters unchanged (see Table 1). ψ can represent
how confident banks are about the economic cycle and, thus, a lower risk
propensity can be associated to a stronger credit constraint phase on credit
market. In our model, banks cannot directly invest in the stock market or
in derivatives, thus a higher risk aversion does not reduce the investment in
speculative assets, but only applies to the credit market.
As shown in Figure 3, when banks are very risk averse (ψ = 2), we find
that: (i) the mean aggregate production reaches its maximum for low val-
ues of weight, that is it slightly increases when the stock market enters in
the evaluation of the firm (weight equal to 10%-15%), but decreases when
this component becomes prevalent; (ii) the volatility of the real aggregate
production (measured by the standard deviation of the growth rate) is quite
stable; (iii) when weight grows, banks ask for higher and higher interest rates
(with a non-linear growth) because the increasing stock market volatility is
heavily valued by banks when ψ is low; (iv) the mean leverage follows the
opposite shape of the interest rate, given that higher rates imply lower target
leverage; (v) the average aggregate net worth has the same shape of the ag-
gregate production (indeed, it is a function of the net worth); (vi) the mean
number of firm’s bankruptcies is stable from weight = 0 to weight = 0.7,
and then it slightly reduces thanks to the leverage reduction that makes firms
more financially robust; (vii) however, the ratio between the aggregate bad
debt (that decreases) and the aggregate extended credit (that reduces even
more) increases, because the defaulted firms present a mean leverage largely
above the mean leverage of the survived firms; (viii) the number of bank
defaults remains almost stable till weight = 0.8 because the mean interest
rate increases and this offsets the higher bad debt ratio, but for weight > 0.8
defaults tend to increase following the growth of the bad debt ratio. To sum
19
Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for parameter weight, from 0 to 1 with step
0.05. Dotted lines when ψ = 2 and solid lines when ψ = 20.
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up, for low values of weight, the stock market can sustain the economy, and
our result could become even better allowing firms to raise funds in the stock
market. Instead, when the stock market is strongly considered by banks
in firms’ evaluation, its presence reduces the aggregate production. Indeed,
when banks are very risk averse, they react to the stock market fluctuations
constraining credit (represented in the model by higher interest rates and
then lower firms’ leverage). This has two consequences: on one hand it
prevents the economy to become too volatile, offsetting the volatility effect
caused by the stock market fluctuations; on the other hand, however, it re-
duces the economic activity.
In the other setting, when banks are prone to risk (ψ = 20), we find that the
interest rate is U-shaped: when the stock market enters in the evaluation it
helps in reducing the interest rates compared to the case of no stock market
influence (because the market value can be higher than the balance sheet
value of the firm, improving the distance-to-default, while the associated in-
creased volatility is barely evaluated by prone to risk banks), but when this
influence becomes too relevant and the volatility of the system increases,
then firms’ stability reduces and banks ask for higher interest rates. As in
the previous case: the average aggregate production (and aggregate firms’
net worth) reaches its maximum for very low values of weight and then it de-
creases; firms’ leverage reduces and this reduces firms’ defaults; but, again,
the bad debt ratio increases because the bad debt decreases less than the
overall debt, indeed the bankrupted firms have both a growing ratio between
mean net worth and mean leverage to average net worth and average lever-
age of the whole population of firms respectively. Consequently the number
of bank defaults increases. Differently from the previous case (ψ = 2), the
low and more stable interest rates (representing a smaller credit constraint)
keep the leverage, and consequently the aggregate production, more stable
between low and high values of parameter weight. However, the increased
macroeconomic volatility, associated with a stronger stock market acceler-
ator, makes firms’ growth more unstable, reducing both firms’ net worth and
leverage. Moreover, banks are weaker because they do not face the increasing
bad debt ratio with growing interest rates.
All in all, we can affirm that a low stock market influence can help the real
economy, but if the stock market component is too strong, then the aggregate
production reduces, the business cycle volatility increases and the banking
system becomes weaker. These fragilities are present both in the case of risk
averse and in the case of risk prone banks. Indeed, when the stock market
is very relevant, a risk averse banking system constrains the supply of credit
and it cools the economy, with a consequent higher bad debt ratio resulting
in a growing number of bank defaults, while a risk prone banking system
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subsidizes firms that live in a more unstable environment, resulting in a even
riskier economic system (stronger financial accelerator) with again a higher
bad debt ratio and number of bank defaults.
6.2 Parameter moltp
Now we analyse how the parameter moltp influences the economy. We rep-
licate the simulation for moltp between 5 and 100, with step 5. All the other
parameters are set as in Table 1; thus, parameter weight is equal to 1 and
the stock market volatility widely affects the determination of the interest
rate through the DD. The parameter moltp has a strong influence in de-
termining the volatility of the stock market. For example, a high moltp can
represent a stock market bubble, that also increases the market volatility. In
other words, a high multiplier increases the stock market capitalization and,
thus, the ratio between market capitalization and balance sheet net worth
(the capitalization ratio), that also becomes much more volatile. When the
EPS multiplier increases, the most important features shown in Figure 4 are:
(i) the mean aggregate production reduces; (ii) the volatility of the real ag-
gregate production growth rate rises; (iii) the interest rate firstly falls, given
that the stock market increases the firms’ value, but then stabilizes, because
the stock market bubble makes the firms’ value more volatile, reducing the
DD10; (iv) the mean leverage, even if the interest rate declines, decreases
because the overall economy is weaker and the expected profit reduces; (v)
firm defaults decrease because leverage decreases, but (vi) bad debt ratio
grows because the average size of defaulted firms raises and, consequently,
the bad debt declines less than the overall outstanding debt; (viii) bank de-
faults sharply rise, because of the interest rate fall and of the bad debt ratio
growth. To sum up, when there is a highly volatile stock market the eco-
nomy is weaker, more volatile and the banking system is more fragile. The
increasing economic fragility has strong monetary policy implications, as we
will see in the next Section.
We conclude that financial shocks, for example a mounting stock market
bubble, can create real economic effects enlarging business fluctuations and
10We repeat the simulation for different values of the risk propensity parameter ψ. The
only remarkable difference concerns the interest rate: for ψ = 2, the interest rates are
higher and are U-shaped when moltp increases; instead, when ψ = 20, the average interest
rates are lower and always decreasing as moltp increases. This is obvious: if ψ is low,
when the stock market grows the DD initially enlarges and, subsequently, the DD reduces
because banks negatively evaluate the capitalization volatility that becomes too ample.
Instead, when banks are very risk-prone, the growing market capitalization has an effect
on the DD larger than the effect of the growing volatility, thus DD increases, making room
for lower interest rates.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis for parameter moltp, from 5 to 100 with step
5.
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reducing aggregate income.
7 Varying stock market multiplier and mon-
etary policy experiment
In this section we compare the effect of a monetary policy expansion (the
opposite holds for a policy rate tightening), that is a reduction of the central
bank interest rate from 3% to 1% at time 601, on the baseline model and
on a slightly different model - that we call “Multiplier” model - in which the
stock market multiplier is affected by the interest rate level. In this second
model we calculate the EPS multiplier in the following way, that considers
40 periods of future discounted cash flows11:
moltpt =
40∑
i=1
1
(1 + rCBt)i
(18)
Among the causes at the basis of an increase of the stock market multiplier
when the monetary policy rate decreases there is, for instance, the low prof-
itability of monetary and bond products that results in a liquidity inflow
into the stock market. This is analytically represented in the above formula
through a smaller discount rate.
We replicate the comparison of the effect of a monetary policy between the
baseline and the “Multiplier” model, for two different level of risk aversion
ψ = 2 (high risk aversion) and ψ = 20 (low risk aversion).
We start with the case of ψ = 2, represented in Figure 5 and 6. In
the baseline model, when the policy rate decreases, the investments increase
driven by a higher leverage (center-left plot of Figure 6) and a short-run
expansion of aggregate production follows (Figure 5). The growth phase
makes room for an expansion of firms’ net worth, as shown in the upper-right
plot of Figure 6. Consequently, the stock market capitalization also increases
11As explained in Section 3.2, the EPS multiplier is based on the dividend discount model
with symplifing assumptions about dividend evolution and number of future cash flow to be
considered for the price evaluation. Here, we add a further simplifying assumption, given
that we do not discount cash flows with an interest rate that considers the stock market
risk premium, but we discount the future cash flows with the risk free rate. However, a
more complex calculation of the multiplier does not change the mechanism involved: the
addiction of a risk premium only shifts the interest rate level used to discount cash flows,
reducing the multiplier, but it does not change the fact that an interest rate reduction
is associate with a multiplier growth, and vice versa. Moreover, the overall value of the
multiplier can be enlarged/reduced considering other factors, such as a the number of
discounted future cash flows.
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Figure 5: Monetary policy expansion at time 600. Red thick line for the
baseline model and black thin line for the “Multiplier” model.
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(Figure 6 upper-left plot), triggering the initially positive effect of the stock
market accelerator: the DD reduces, therefore the interest rates further lower.
However, after a while, the higher levels of leverage and capitalization ratio
enlarge the financial accelerator mechanisms, making the economic system
more volatile: more firms and banks go bankrupt, reducing the overall wealth.
When deciding monetary policy changes, central banks should consider this
counteracting effect due to the instability caused by the increased financial
accelerator.
These mechanisms are even stronger when the stock market multiplier
depends on the interest rate. In this model, the interest rate cut implies
a strong stock market growth, and the capitalization ratio largely increases
(upper-left panel of Figure 6), enlarging the stock market accelerator. Indeed,
when the interest rate reduces, the stock market multiplier increases from
23.1 to 32.8 (while in the baseline model it is fixed at 20) and the stock
market becomes more volatile. In practice, the initial expansion is a bit
stronger compared to the baseline case, thanks to the growth of the stock
market. However, the medium run overall benefits on aggregate production
(Figure 5) are even of a minor magnitude. In other words, the incorporation
of the interest rate into the multiplier partially counteracts the expansive
effect of the monetary policy too. It implies a lower net worth and a higher
25
Figure 6: Monetary policy expansion at time 600. ψ = 2. Red thick line for
the baseline model and black thin line for the “Multiplier” model.
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number of defaults for firms and banks.
We repeat the same experiment for very risk-prone banks in the credit
market, that is with ψ = 20, obtaining very similar results. The differences
are only quantitative (see Table 2): in this case the monetary policy is more
effective on the aggregate production, because the banking system strongly
transmits the monetary policy impulse to the real economy.
Table 2: Aggregate variables change as a consequence of a monetary policy
expansion (rCB1−600 = 3%, rCB601−1000 = 1%). We refer to “Base” as the
baseline model and to “Mult” as the model with variable EPS multiplier. The
∆ is the difference between the value (average or standard deviation) of the
variable calculated in period t = 601−1000 and the value calculated in period
t = 201− 600.
Variable ∆Base, ψ = 2 ∆Mult, ψ = 2 ∆Base, ψ = 20 ∆Mult, ψ = 20
Average aggregate production +23196 +18212 +50954 +48371
Growth rate volatility +0.95% +1.19% +1.53% +2.18%
Average leverage +1.20 +1.02 +2.19 +2.31
Leverage volatility +0.11 +0.12 +0.30 +0.37
Average bad debt ratio +0.58% +0.64% +0.50% +0.58%
Average bank defaults +0.16 +0.43 +0.29 +0.63
Thus, if the monetary expansion is done when banks are risk-prone, for in-
stance in a small downturn of the business cycle, it can exploit much of its
expected positive effects, while if it is done during a big financial crisis, it is
probably less useful. However, as Table 2 highlights, when banks are more
risk-prone the interest rate reduction also enlarges the economic volatility
and the banking system fragility. Probably, it is not by chance that the
financial crisis started in 2007-2008, at the end of a quite long period char-
acterized by very low interest rates, with banks taking increasing risk (not
only in the credit market). Moreover, the monetary policy expansion applied
after the beginning of the crisis were dampened by the increased banks risk
aversion.
Nowadays, Central Banks operate monetary policy measures even stronger
than the short term interest rates reduction. Indeed, unconventional mon-
etary policies, such as the quantitative easing measure, aimed at long term
interest rates reduction, but also at financial markets prices growth. There-
fore, the instability caused by the increased financial accelerator, also related
to the risk of a growing bubble on financial asset prices, has to be carefully
considered by Central Banks. For instance, the unconventional monetary
policies implemented by the Federal Reserve push the Dow Jones Industrial
index at its historical maximum in 2015, while the Bank of Japan interven-
tions drive the Nikkei 225 index at its maximum in the last 10 years, even
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if the real economies of these countries are not performing as well as their
stock markets.
However, for a deeper analysis of the unconventional monetary policy easing
effects, our setting has to be further improved in order to consider:
• the demand growth due to: (i) the wealth effect on families related to
stock market growth, with consequent consumption increase, (ii) the
exchange rate depreciation with consequent export increase;
• the presence of a primary stock market for firms. In this case a growing
stock market can help firms to issue new stocks in order to recapitalize
and to reduce leverage, while in our model a stock market boom is
associated with lower interest rates and higher leverage;
• the portfolio choices by investors and banks.
Nevertheless, even if the first item surely improves the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy, also for this aspect the volatility of the stock market has to be
considered, for instance, to determine the wealth effect on households. About
the second item, we recall that the growing equity capitalization can be also
associated with a growing debt, in order to keep the leverage around its tar-
get as explained by the already cited Dynamic Trade-Off theory, and this
mechanism is the basis of the present study. Moreover, the secondary stock
market transaction volume is much bigger than the primary stock market
volume and a secondary market growth can divert wealth from real economy
financing to financial speculation, that can also increase the banking system
risks and its fragility. Therefore, the related portfolio choice modeling has to
be enhanced very carefully in future works.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we add the presence of the stock market to a framework similar
to the agent based model of Riccetti et al. (2013). The stock market values
influence the distance-to-default, used to evaluate firms’ financial soundness
and, thus, to set the interest rates charged by banks to them. The presence of
the stock market enriches the positive feedback mechanism of the Financial
Accelerator, that is now threefold:
1. leverage accelerator. Negative shocks on firms’ output make banks
less willing to loan funds and firms less willing to invest in projects
with lower expected profits (mechanism represented by increased in-
terest rates charged by banks and risk averse firms characterized by
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a capital structure modeled with the dynamic trade-off theory), hence
firms might reduce their investment and this leads again to lower out-
put;
2. stock market accelerator. This is the most important innovation
of the paper. A firm that experiences a lower profit, has a decreasing
capitalization on the stock market; thus DD reduces and banks ask a
higher interest rate. The increased interest rate further reduces the
profit and the firm’s willingness to enlarge its debt in order to expand
investments, amplifying the leverage financial accelerator;
3. network-based accelerator. Bankruptcies deteriorate banks’ finan-
cial condition thus leading to higher interest rates to all borrowers
(Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, p.145). This further increases the weak-
ness of the whole non-financial sector. Thus, the presence of a credit
network may produce an avalanche of firm bankruptcies, in another
vicious circle that can make banks go bankrupt too.
The first two mechanisms are the trigger of the financial accelerator, the
third makes possible that an idiosyncratic shock creates an extended/global
crisis without the need of a systemic shock.
In this framework, we find some interesting results, besides confirming
some already found in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) and Riccetti et al. (2013),
such as the emergent right-skew distribution of firms’ and banks’ size even if
all firms start from the same conditions.
An important result is that if banks consider the firms’ stock market value
in evaluating the distance-to-default, the economy can benefit till the influ-
ence of the stock market is limited. If the stock market impact becomes too
relevant, its volatility could damage the real economy. When the stock mar-
ket impact is strong, an increase of the stock market volatility, for instance
caused by a stock market multiplier rise, is widely influent in worsening the
performance of the real economy, because it enlarges the stock market finan-
cial accelerator.
A very important implication for monetary policy is that when the policy
rate decreases (the opposite holds for a policy rate tightening) a short-run
expansion of aggregate production follows, but it is partially counteracted
by the increasing financial accelerator that enlarges aggregate production
volatility and banks’ financial fragility. Central Banks should consider this
counteracting effect when deciding monetary policy changes.
This result is even stronger in the simulation in which the stock market
multiplier is affected by the interest rate level, as really happens because
investors discount the future cash flows (such as dividends) at a lower rate
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(and practically the low profitability of monetary and bond products results
in a liquidity inflow into the stock market). Indeed, when the stock market
multiplier increases as a consequence of an interest rate decline, the effects
on aggregate production is of a minor magnitude due to the even stronger
stock market financial accelerator. Thus, the incorporation of the interest
rate into the multiplier also counteracts the expansive effect of the monetary
policy on the real economy in the medium term.
As explained in the previous Section, the model has to be further de-
veloped. However, as illustrated in the Introduction, beyond the specific
conclusions of our simulations and their use in order to evaluate the effects
of the monetary policy, the paper contribution to the existing literature is
twofold:
• theoretically, we describe a triple financial accelerator, adding the “stock
market accelerator”;
• methodologically, we insert in an agent-based computational frame-
work some simple mechanisms, well known in the mainstream liter-
ature, which are able to describe some empirical features such as the
relationship between profits and stock market values or the relationship
between monetary policy and stock market values.
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